The incentives of incumbents to promote or oppose financial sector development differ across industries depending on the extent to which the lack of external finance is a more important constraint to entry than future growth. The relative strength or rents of promoters and opponents determines the political equilibrium level of financial system development. This may be perturbed by the effect of trade liberalization in the strength of each group. Using a sample of 41 trade liberalizers we conduct an event study and show that the strengthening of promoters vis-à-vis opponents is a good predictor of subsequent financial development. The early 1970s oil shock had similar effects. Incentives or the aggregate benefit of developing the financial system alone do not seem enough to generate financial development; rents in particular hands appear to be necessary to grease the wheels of the political machine.
I. Introduction
It has been extensively documented that the level of financial development varies greatly across countries (LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) ). Existing theories that try to explain these differences tend to rely on stable, largely predetermined factors such as a country's legal origin (in the line of LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) ), pattern of colonization (Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) ), religion and culture (Stulz and Williamson (2003)), and social capital endowment (Guiso et al., (2004) ). Less documented, however, is the fact that a country's financial development exhibits non-trivial changes in time that rival its crosssectional variation. A quick look at the data reveals that the rank in terms of level of private credit to GDP in the early 1970s explains only 51% of the cross-country variance in the rank 25 years later 1 . This suggests that, successful as they are in explaining the cross-section variation, predetermined factors cannot be the only force behind the observed differences in financial development.
If financial development matters for economic performance, as demonstrated by the large body of literature that has documented its positive, first order impact on economic growth, 2 and it is not completely predetermined, why then some countries do achieve financial development while others do not? A compelling answer to this question has been put forward by a recent literature that emphasizes the role of private interests and politics as determinants of financial development (Rajan and Zingales (2003) , Perotti and Volpin (2004) ). The political economy approach seems sensible. First, there is ample evidence that policies such as the protection of creditor rights or minority shareholders do matter for financial development (La Porta et al (1997) ). Second, financial development seems not to affect everybody equally, as documented by several recent papers that focus on the differential impact of financial development across industries and firms (Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Kroszner and Strahan (1999) , Braun (2002) , Raddatz (2006) , Braun and Larrain (2005) ). This suggests that distinct policies affecting the development of financial markets are likely to have important distributive consequences, 3 providing fertile ground for political economy mechanisms.
This paper takes the political economy view of financial development to the data and provides empirical evidence that political economy considerations can in fact go a long way into explaining the differences in financial development observed within countries across time.
We start from Rajan and Zingales' (2003) idea that the main source of conflict arising from financial development comes from the fact that a well developed financial system enhances competition in the industrial sector by allowing easier entry. We note, however, that the impact of financial development on competition is likely to vary across industries. In some industries the lack of external finance may be an important constraint to entry, while in others technological considerations such as the minimum efficient scale may be the main constraint on competition. Thus, incumbents in various industries may weigh differently the benefits of easier access to credit associated with a more developed financial system against the costs of more intense competition.
Using industry level data for a large cross section of countries we exploit the de-facto heterogeneous impact of cross-country financial development on incumbent's rents across industries to measure each sector's willingness to promote or oppose financial sector development. We classify each industry as either a promoter or an opponent to financial development, assuming that this industry characteristic is maintained across countries because of its technological drivers. We presume that incumbents in sectors where financial development has a smaller (larger) impact on rents are less (more)
likely to concur in the costs of blocking financial reform.
Incentives alone are not enough to induce political change, however. Having the means to transform one's views into actual policies (i.e. convince policy makers) is critical. We therefore associate the relative strength of promoters vis-à-vis opponents with their relative rents. Here is where our story departs from non-political economy explanations for financial development. Our null hypothesis is that if political economy considerations related to the impact of financial development on competition matter, variation in the relative strength of promoters should map into changes in financial sector development.
In order to avoid the omitted variable bias problem of cross-country regressions and to address the endogeneity of rents, we setup an event study based on the effects that trade liberalization has on relative industry rents. We treat trade liberalization as a discrete, reasonable exogenous shock to the political economy equilibrium of financial sector development.
We find that in those countries where trade liberalization results in an increase in the relative strength of promoters end up with a significantly larger financial system than those countries where trade liberalization favors those who oppose financial development. The difference in financial developmentmeasured as the ratio of private credit to GDP-between these two groups of countries increases by 18
percentage points. The result is robust to a battery of tests that includes controlling for demand-side determinants of financial development, different strategies to classify promoters and opponents, the use of different event study windows, excluding potentially influential industries, dealing with potential endogeneity concerns, and several other changes to the specification.
Trade liberalization is, of course, not the only shock that can change the politics of financial development. In order to validate our results, we replicate the procedure with the 1973 oil shock, an event that is arguably more exogenous than trade liberalization. We find the same results.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Previous evidence on the relation between financial development and competition -that forms the basis of our political economy mechanism-has been provided by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , which shows that most of the difference in growth between more and less external finance dependent industries across countries sorted by financial development comes from differences in the growth of the number of firms as opposed to the growth of the typical establishment. Related to this, Cetorelli (2001 Cetorelli ( , 2003 , and Cetorelli and Strahan (2003) show that lower degrees of banking competition are associated with larger firms across countries, across US States, and following the passage of the Second European Banking Directive. We provide additional evidence on the link between financial development and competition by showing that both aggregate manufacturing sector price-cost margins and average firm size are significant and negatively correlated with financial development across countries. However, we also show that there is important heterogeneity on the impact of financial development on these measures across industries.
Of course, the effect of financial development on product market competition that we consider here is not the only way in which political economy considerations can matter for the financial system. Section II explains our empirical methodology, including measurement issues and a discussion of the assumptions that are implicit in our approach. Section III presents the main result of the paper, and Section IV concludes.
II. Methodology
Our empirical approach is aimed at building a test for the hypothesis that a shock to the ability to influence politics of those parties that favor or oppose financial development will affect the subsequent development of the financial sector. If we were able to identify the different parties, had a measure of their relative strength, and knew the date in which a shock to this relative strength occurred for a sample of countries, we could test the hypothesis by conducting an event study around the date of the shock and estimating the parameters of the following regression: 
where ∆FD c is a measure of the change in financial development, and Strengthening of Promoters is a measure of the change in the relative strength of the parties that favor financial development (the promoters), both computed around the date of the shock. Xc is a general set of possible controls, and εc is the error term, which may include several components. Testing the hypothesis in this setting would be equivalent to test whether the coefficient β is significantly positive.
We make three mayor assumptions in order to apply the framework above: one, that there are differences in incentives of firms for financial sector development which vary by industries, but are similar across countries; two, that the means to oppose or promote financial development are related to industry rents; and three, that relative industry rents are affected by discrete events such as trade liberalization or the 1970s oil shock. The first assumption allows us to identify the different parties of the political economy game, the second one to measure their relative strength at any point in time, and the third one to capture reasonable exogenous changes in this relative strength.
A. Identifying promoters and opponents of financial development There are many dimensions along which the development of the financial system can have an asymmetric effect across groups. Although we could, in principle, identify winners and losers along each dimension, this paper focuses on the conflict across groups comes from the effect that financial development has on the product market. The idea that finance has an effect on how firms conduct business is not new (see, for instance, Chevalier (1995), Phillips (1995) ). Rajan and Zingales (2003) , in particular, provide the basic mechanism on which we build here. They argue that a more developed financial system reduces the correlation between credit allocation and a borrower's collateral and reputation, which facilitates the entry of new firms, increasing the degree of competition and therefore reducing the rents of incumbents. PCM is essentially a measure of the profitability of incumbents, the flow accrued to the owners of capital.
One can think of a number of refinements to this indicator -that would take into account the amount of capital invested and indirect taxes, in particular. Our choice is dictated primarily by simplicity and data availability. Since, as will be made clear below, we will not be using the level of PCM but will just rely on its within-country, cross-industry variation, the simplification is unlikely to be of first-order importance. The methodology implies that the fact that some industries have higher margins everywhere due to larger capital requirements or taxes (tobacco and oil, for instance), or that some countries exhibit higher margins across the board (perhaps due to a lower level of competition or higher regulatory requirements) will have no impact at all in our measurement.
We are not the first to use PCM to proxy for the degree of product market competition. The measure has been shown to be strongly positively correlated with measures of concentration across industries (see for example Domowitz et al., 1986; Collins and Preston, 1969; Clarke et al., 1984; and Encaoua and Jacquemin, 1980) . Panel B of Figure I shows this relation in the U.S.
Although incumbents appear on average worse off relative to potential entrants in countries with more developed financial systems, the effect can vary significantly across industries. Incumbents whose rents are positively affected are probably more willing to maintain policies to increase financial sector development. Of course, financial development may also have some differential impact on rents within industries but we focus only on the between industries dimension mainly because our data do not allow us to consider within industry heterogeneity 4 . We do not believe our approach significantly limits or biases the analysis. First, in many countries incumbents organize in trade associations organized along industry dimensions. This suggests that within industry organization that relies on these existing channels may be easier than across industry organization. Second, if the boundaries that define who favors or oppose financial development were just loosely connected with industry dimensions, the classification we present next would be a poor proxy for the real political forces behind financial reform. This would considerably stack the cards against finding any evidence for our political economy mechanism based on such classification.
To identify the relative promoters and opponents of financial development we look at the effect of financial development on the PCM of 28 different three digit ISIC industries across countries by estimating the parameters of the following regression: (2), are presented in Table I .
Column one reports the estimated effects, and column two, the standard deviations. The demeaned values of the effects are reported in column three. A simple inspection of the table shows that there is indeed significant variation on the estimated effects across industries. The dispersion in the estimated sensitivities can be observed also in Figure IIIa . The figure plots the η coefficients of each industry against its private-credit-weighted average PCM. It is apparent that the relationship is not materially affected by a few outliers.
Two comments regarding the estimation of (2) The relationship between incumbent rents and financial development is, of course, quite complex. A number of industry characteristics are likely to be involved. Since there is not much previous research upon which to rely here, it is difficult to come up with good a priori proxies for some potentially important ones (such as the importance of innovation or the minimum efficient scale). Our approach reflects these problems and takes an agnostic position regarding which industries we expect to be relatively more and less affected. We just let the data speak under the assumption that the relative incentives of different industries in promoting financial sector development are reasonably constant across countries. The de-facto measure turns out to be correlated with a number of industry characteristics that should be relevant for the effect of financial development on the outcome of incumbents across industries, and -because of their technological nature-are not likely to change significantly across countries. Promoters industries tend to naturally (i.e. as measured in the U.S. data) have higher liquidity needs (as measured by the cash conversion cycle 5 ), invest a higher share of cash flows, to be less tangible, and to have lower natural entry and exit. Also, old promoters exhibit higher external finance requirements relative to young promoters when compared to opponents. In the empirical section we explore further the role of external finance dependence.
It should be noted, however, that PCM also includes the normal returns to capital, which may depend on the relative price of capital to labor that changes significantly across countries. Financial development could be a proxy for a country's capital abundance, and rents a proxy for an industry's capital intensity. If this channel were empirically important then η should be strongly positively correlated with an industry's capital intensity, and financial development should increase with PCM.
Instead, the correlation between η and capital per worker is negative and not significant, and financial development is associated with lower, not higher, average PCMs. Despite these findings, we will control for the possible implications of this channel in our benchmark regression below. The channel will prove unimportant.
As a robustness check we consider an alternative measure of how incumbents are differently affected by financial development based on quantity instead of price variables. In particular, we measure the extent to which average firm size across industries is related to private credit. The ranking of industries along this dimension is very similar to the one using the PCM measure. The correlation of the two variables is 0.58, significant at 1% levels. The results turn out to be basically same. The relationship between the PCM and the size measures is depicted in Figure IIIb .
We use the η coefficients to distinguish between those industries that favor (in relative terms) policies conducive to the development of the financial system (henceforth the "Promoters") and those industries that oppose these policies (henceforth the "Opponents"). We identify the promoters (opponents) with those industries with a η coefficient above (below) the median. We follow this approach for three reasons. First, it allows us to classify the industries in a parsimonious manner that has the advantage of simultaneously taking explicitly into consideration the relative nature of the estimated coefficients, and including the same number of industries in each group. In this way we are not stacking the cards against one particular group simply by including more industries among its members. 6 Second, this separation takes into account the natural clustering of the estimated coefficients. Third, although it would be possible to rely on the point estimates as measures of the degree of opposition of an industry to financial development instead of classifying the industries into two groups, we do not follow this route because it requires the specific numerical differences in coefficients across industries to have explanatory power. Given the lack of precision of individual estimates and the lack of significance of many one-toone comparisons, we believe it is preferable instead to focus on the broad, statistically significant differences across groups of industries. Nevertheless, we check our results using the point estimates as measures of the degree of opposition and find that, although considerably less precise, our results are qualitatively similar.
B. Measuring the relative strength of the parties
Incentives by themselves are not enough to induce financial development in our political economy story. In addition, the ability to influence policies is necessary. We measure this ability by the relative rents of promoters vis-à-vis opponents. Rents provide promoters (opponents) the means to foster (obstruct) financial development through campaign contributions, fees for lobbying services, or the direct bribing of politicians depending on the institutional environment. Arguably, a competitive firm whose income covers only factor payments would have a harder time trying to finance these types of activities than a firm with abundant rents at its disposition. Accordingly, we define the relative strength of promoters of financial development as follows: 
PCM
are the value-added weighted average PCM of promoters and opponents respectively; and, for each industry i that belongs to the group of promoters or opponents, share i is the share of that industry's value added in the total manufacturing value added in the country. 7 C. Trade liberalization and the shock to the political economy equilibrium
In the mechanism we have in mind, the relative strength of promoters is an important determinant of the equilibrium level of financial system development. Testing whether countries where promoters are strongest tend to have more developed financial systems directly is problematic for two reasons. First, omitted variable bias would be a significant concern. We do not intend to argue that the mechanism we propose here is the only or main thing determining financial development; just that it is relevant. Second, the very nature of the mechanism implies that relative rents should be endogenous if the groups are to care enough about financial development to try shaping it. Also, it is not clear that the test would have enough power since absent significant perturbations to this political economy equilibrium we would not expect significant changes in financial development.
We address both the omitted variable and endogeneity issues using an event study methodology instead. This also allows us to explore the time series of financial development which is one of the main motivations of this paper. Three main assumptions are needed for this to be valid: first, that there is an event in the sense of a discrete change in conditions; second, that the event perturbs the relative strength of promoters; and third, that the event is reasonably exogenous to the politics of financial development. We discuss and provide evidence for each of these in the context of trade liberalization Thus, trade liberalization seems to be a reasonably discrete event that has a heterogeneous effect on relative margins. This is the main source of variation our dependent variable is based upon.
Strengthening of promoters was computed for each country as the change in the strength of promoters
around the trade liberalization event:
where the shares are computed as above, except that they correspond to the average value in the five year window before liberalization, 12 and ∆PCM i corresponds to the change in average PCM of an industry in a five year window around liberalization date τ : The last cause of concern with our view of trade liberalization as a shock to the political economy equilibrium is the potential endogeneity of trade liberalization. Agents could anticipate the financial effects of trade liberalization and internalize them in their decision to open up. Below we will deal with this issue in a number of ways, and will prove to be unimportant for our main results. However, in order to test our hypothesis in the broadest possible way and with the caveat of data limitations, we will also look at the impact of the oil-price shock on the strength of the different parties in the same way we measure the impact of trade liberalization. This shock is more clearly exogenous to the balance of power between local parties.
III. Results
In this section we show that the cross-country variation in financial development following trade liberalization can be explained in part with our measure of the strengthening of promoters. We first document some stylized facts on the relation between trade liberalization and financial development in the cross-section of countries that highlight both the role of liberalization as a shock to the political economy equilibrium and the variation of the data that we try to explain. Next, we present our main result, check its robustness, provide details of the mechanism, and use the liberalization experiment within the political economy framework to further explore the real effects of financial development.
A. Trade and financial development
Here we present novel evidence of the relationship between trade and financial development 13 . Table II provides summary statistics for a sample of 73 countries for which we have complete data for both trade openness and private credit to GDP during the 1970s, 80s and 90s. We split the data into two groups based on whether the country liberalized trade during the period or not, and compute a ranking The data show that trade liberalization is a perturbation to the high persistence of private credit.
There is then a way to reconcile the institutional view -consistent with high persistence-with the idea that opening the economy to trade changes matters.
B. Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial development

Specification and Data
Using the measure of the strengthening of promoters defined in section 2.2, introducing some specific controls, and specifying the form of the error term, the benchmark specification in (1) 
where FD ∆ is the change in the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP computed as the difference between the average ratio between t-5 and t-1, and the average ratio between t+5 and t+10 α β δ are the parameters to be estimated. Our hypothesis is that the coefficient of interest β is positive and statistically significant.
We do not include stock market measures of financial development in the analysis mainly for data reasons. A number of countries in the sample simply do not have a stock market, and, for those that do, traditional data sources only provide indicators for very recent periods (from 1992 or 1996), well after the date when they liberalized trade. This reduced the sample significantly and we did not obtain any clear-cut result. We also think that within industry heterogeneity is likely to be much more important in the decision of whether to promote or oppose stock market development than the cross-industry heterogeneity we exploit in this paper. While virtually all firms within an industry will depend on bank credit, only a few firms (the very large ones) will even consider going public. Table A1 shows the basic characteristics of the sample of 41 countries Lastly, we allow for heteroskedasticity and the possibility of errors to be clustered around trade liberalization dates.
Main Result
The first column in Table III shows that the coefficient of the strengthening of promoters is positive and highly significant. The initial level of private credit to GDP turns out not to be significantly associated with subsequent changes in the variable after the event. . Before trade liberalization the two groups are remarkably similar both in terms of the level of bank credit (around 25% of GDP) and its evolution. Shortly after liberalization, though, the group of countries for which the shock advances the political prospects of improving the financial system shows rapidly increasing private credit, ending up at around 45% of GDP or almost twice the value before the event. In contrast, in the countries where conditions for developing the financial system do not improve as much, private credit shows on average no significant change, ending up at roughly the same level as before. The post-liberalization difference between the two groups is quite large, comparable to the distance between Denmark and Ecuador or Chile and Libya in the 1990s.
One can alternatively rely on quantity measures that, although indirect, also suggest the existence of incumbent rents. We compute the strengthening of promoters of financial development substituting the effect of financial development on margins with the effect of financial development on average firm size across industries. The average firm size measure has been used before in similar contexts 18 . The ranking of industries along this dimension turns out to be almost identical to the one based on margins, and therefore to yield very similar results in terms of its power to explain trade liberalization-induced financial development (see column 5).
Supply or Demand
The result in the first column, although indicative, does not necessarily imply that financial development was formerly constrained by poor policy. Demand considerations are a real possibility. In fact, whether the level of financial development responds primarily to demand or to supply factors has been the main issue in this literature at least since the pioneering efforts of Goldsmith (1969) . In our context, trade liberalization, and more generally the reform process, can shift the investment possibility frontier and thus alter the demand for funds. This would introduce omitted variable bias if the change in demand for funds happened to be correlated with the strengthening of promoters variable.
Columns 2 and 3 (6 and 7 for the size-based measure of strengthening of promoters) try to address the issue by adding two controls thought to be associated to investment possibilities and the demand for funds: the change in GDP growth and investment rate around the liberalization date. Neither the effect of trade liberalization on GDP growth nor its effect on the change in the investment rate seems to be driving our result. They do not enter significantly nor do materially affect the size of the coefficient for strengthening of promoters.
It might still be the case that growth or investment take time to become visible or that they are just poor measures of the change in investment possibilities. Instead of trying to measure how the frontier shifts one can assume that countries were initially close to their own frontier and that this frontier shifts out to achieve a common level for all countries that liberalize (a level given by common world factors). If this is so, a country's initial position can be used as a measure of the distance to the expanded frontier or new investment possibilities. We approximate each country's initial position with the average GDP per capita in the 5-year period preceding trade liberalization. Again, adding this variable has no effect on our results.
Endogeneity of Trade Liberalization and Further Robustness
Why would some countries open up for trade knowing that this would unleash political economy forces leading to financial underdevelopment? Wouldn't the agents involved anticipate the effects? This issue is important but should not be overemphasized. First, trade liberalization has been shown to have a positive effect (for the effect on growth, see Sachs and Warner (1995) ), so that it may be worthwhile to open up even at the cost of having a relatively less well developed financial system. Second, our result shows that on average trade liberalization is associated with 8 points of GDP higher private credit; only a few countries actually decrease their degree of development in absolute terms. Furthermore, the exact effect of trade liberalization across sectors might not be obvious a-priori (see, for instance, the argument put forward by Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) ). In expectation the effect on subsequent financial development is in fact an additional benefit in the aggregate.
The general issue we are concerned with is the existence of a third (omitted) variable driving both the political economy variable and financial development. Having included only countries that actually liberalized and also controlled for the timing of the decision, the issue speaks to the reasons for liberalizing trade and how these can interact with that of developing the financial system. Trade and financial liberalization do not necessarily come isolated but may be part of a reform process that includes both. To introduce bias in our estimation one needs to argue that the reason why some countries adopt them together and others don't is correlated with the strengthening of promoters variable.
One possibility is that the degree of bundling of policies is a function of local forces. The Cross-industry incentives can also be at the heart of the reasons to liberalize trade. It may be that those countries that developed the financial system further after opening to trade just happened to be those in which promoters of trade and finance coincided, and not necessarily those in which promoters of financial development were strengthened by trade liberalization. 19 We addressed this concern in the following way, for each group (promoters and opponents of financial development) we computed the average margin for those industries in the US in the period right before trade liberalization. We interpret the margin in the US as the (normalized) international price of output and take the difference of it across groups as an indicator of the relative incentive of promoters of financial development to liberalize trade.
Column 3 shows that this is not the case: this variable is virtually uncorrelated with our basic one and does not enter significantly in the regression. The politics of trade liberalization do not seem, at least in this sample, tightly intertwined with the specific political economy mechanism of financial development discussed here. The fact that almost all countries decided to liberalize in a relatively short period of time, and that this time happened to coincide with the emergence of a strong international political agenda towards free trade points to the view that the trade process was more the result of external forces, and largely independent to the financial development ones.
Still, external forces can also be related to the bundling of reforms. One case would be that of a country subject to the structural reforms conditionality of IMF programs. We do not have data on the exact conditions imposed by each IMF program in each country. However, we can measure the likelihood that the IMF involvement implied the commitment to all-encompassing reforms (as opposed to just trade- A mayor crisis can be thought of an event that triggers conflict between powerful groups that would otherwise coexist extracting rents out of weaker groups (Tornell (1998) ). The existence of a crisis prior to trade liberalization can be correlated with the strengthening of promoters if the industries in this group tend to be more affected and therefore to see a larger recovery in their margins once the crisis is over. In columns 5 and 6 we add, respectively, indicators for the existence of economic (GDP growth below -5%) and political (government crisis or revolution, from Arthur S. Banks Cross-National Time Series Data Archive) crisis in the five years prior to trade liberalization. Interestingly, the likelihood that financial development follows trade liberalization seems to be lower, not higher if a crisis supposedly motivated the reforms (both coefficients are negative and of relevant economic magnitude). The mechanism is independent to the one we propose, though.
We conducted a number of additional robustness tests that are not reported. We formed groups of industries based on whether the response of their PCM to GDP per capita, to the economy size, to country physical capital abundance and industry capital intensity, and to country openness to trade, was above or below the median level, measured their strengthening around trade liberalization dates in a similar way as above, and included them as additional regressors in our benchmark specification. The idea was to determine whether our measure of strengthening of promoters was driven by other variables that are likely to change around trade liberalization. We also played with the size of the windows used to measure the change in PCMs and the change in financial development, excluded industries (tobacco and oil) for which the country-specific PCM might not be a very good measure of rents because of country-industry specific tax rate variation, and excluded industries located two deciles around the median of the sensitivity of PCM to financial development to keep just the industries that clearly belong to one or the other group. None of these affected the result in a material way.
In column 8 we report coefficients and standard errors for the benchmark regression (in column 1, Table III ) obtained by performing a parametric bootstrapping on the sensitivities of the different industry's PCM to financial development. This procedure addresses the problem of "generated regressors" that can bias the OLS-based inference. The bootstrapping procedure takes explicitly into account the imprecision of the estimated sensitivities and should therefore produce correct standard errors in our baseline regression. Also, by bootstrapping on the estimated sensitivities and looking at the empirical distribution of the coefficient we can rule out that our noisy classification generates a significant relationship in our benchmark specification purely by chance. The mean coefficient obtained from the bootstrapping procedure is very similar to the benchmark coefficient (although somewhat smaller), and most importantly, is still significant at the 1 percent level. 21 We also defined promoters and opponents based on margins and financial development data across countries during the 1960s, with the idea of avoiding making this identification using data for the same period when most of the trade liberalizations occur (the 1980s and 1990s). This allowed us to extract this relationship in a period where the world as a whole was quite closed to international trade, and therefore the relative prices within countries were supposedly more dependent on local factors. The rank correlation between 1960s and the benchmark measures turned out quite high (0.68), and the results unchanged (see column 9). We experimented with other periods for the measurement of the margins elasticity to financial development and came to the conclusion that the results are not very sensitive to this issue 22 .
By looking at the difference between those industries with high and low sensitivities to financial development we are implicitly taken the estimated sensitivities into account, but in a discrete rather than continuous way. Although it would be possible to rely on the point estimates as measures of the degree of opposition of an industry to financial development instead of classifying the industries into two groups, we do not follow this route because it requires the specific numerical differences in coefficients across industries to have explanatory power. Given the lack of precision of individual estimates and the lack of significance of many one-to-one comparisons, we believe it is preferable instead to focus on the broad, statistically significant differences across groups of industries. We nevertheless checked the results using the continuous measure of strengthening in column 10. The coefficient on the continuous variable has the correct sign and similar magnitude as the one obtained with the discrete classification. However, as expected, the lack of precision of the measure built using the noisy values of the coefficients translates into lack of statistical significance. Moreover, when included together with our measure of strengthening (column 11) the coefficient is still not statistically significant and turns negative, which indicates that the positive coefficient obtained in column 10 was largely due to the correlation between this variable and the broad differences between groups captured in our preferred measure of strengthening.
The 1973 Oil Shock Event
Trade liberalization is not the only shock that can change the politics of financial development. In order to validate our results, we replicate the procedure with the 1973 oil shock. The main advantage of using the oil shock is the fact that this is more exogenous than trade liberalization. The disadvantages are that (because of data availability) our sample drops from 41 to 29 countries, and that since the oil shock affects all countries at the same time, we cannot include time fixed-effects. In Table V we replicate our Table III benchmark results. To account for large differences in the importance of oil across economies, we add to the specification a dummy variable capturing whether the country is in North Africa or the Middle East, and a variable that measures the share of oil in total exports. Furthermore,
given that (precisely because of its importance) in some countries the oil industry may be subject to different political processes, we present the results including all industries and leaving the oil-related industries aside.
The coefficient associated to the strengthening of promoters enters positively and significantly as expected, suggesting that our previous results are not entirely related to the particular shock considered but can be generalized to other changes in the political balance between promoters and opponents of financial development. Again, the result is generally robust to the inclusion of several variables meant to capture changes in the demand of external finance, and is not sensitive to the choice of the sensitivity of PCMs versus the average size to cross-country financial development as the variable to classify industries as promoters and opponents (not reported).
Competing Explanations
The political economy mechanism we propose here is not the only one that can trigger financial sector reform. We consider a couple of alternatives in Table VI .
The first one is related to variation across industries in their dependence on external funds as in At a very general level, what differentiates our story from non-political economy ones is that in the latter financial sector development would just be a function of incentives, and not also of the rents of the different players. The incentive for a country to reform and develop its financial system is likely related to the importance or relative size of the groups that benefit significantly from this. Trade liberalization may change the importance of these groups and trigger financial reform through a channel independent of ours. To test the competing hypotheses we measure of the change in the aggregate incentives to develop the financial system as the change in the size of industries sorted by their incentives to promote financial development and add this measure to our benchmark specification. We built this measure in two ways: (i) using our discrete separation between promoters and opponents we computed the Change in Size of Promoters, as the pre-post trade liberalization change in the relative share of value added of promoters using the t-5 to t-1, and t+1 to t+5 averages shares; (ii) using the point estimates of the sensitivity of each industry's PCM to financial development (see Table I ) we computed the Change in As an additional way of disentangling these two hypotheses, we also estimated the parameters of the levels version of our benchmark specification using country-year panel data: 
where FD is the level of private credit to GDP in country i at time t, PCGDP is the level of per capita GDP, and α c and α t are country and time fixed effects, respectively. Strength of Promoters is measured at time t-1 assuming that the political economy mechanism takes some time to influence financial development, and to partially address the endogeneity issue. For Size of promoters, we experimented with two different measures built using our discrete and continuous separation between promoter and opponent industries in a similar fashion as in the previous paragraph. Relative size of promoters is the difference in the share in value added of Promoters and Opponents, and Share of industry weighted by sensitivity of
Margins to Financial Development is the product of the share of an industry in value added and our continuous estimates of the sensitivity of margins to financial development (Table I) . The results of this estimation are reported in Table VII . They show that the lagged value of the strength of promoters is positively and significantly related to the level of financial development. When the relative size of promoters is used as the explanatory variable -either in its discrete or its continuous version-the coefficient is never significant. Furthermore, the strength of promoters is still positive and significant when both variables are added to the specification. With all the caveats of this type of estimation, we believe that finding the expected correlation between the strength of promoters and financial development in this setting is encouraging and provides an additional confirmation of our main results.
These two pieces of evidence favor the political economy hypothesis. Incentives or the aggregate benefit of developing the financial system alone do not seem enough to generate financial development. Rents in particular hands appear to be necessary to grease the wheels of the political machine.
IV. Conclusion
This paper showed that the trade liberalization-induced strengthening of promoters vis-à-vis opponents of financial development is a good predictor of subsequent changes in financial sector depth.
From a policy standpoint the results are important in two ways. First, although deep institutional reasons play a role, to an important extent, countries have the level of financial development they choose. Policy convergence to best-practice standards is not likely to happen automatically unless the political economy conditions for such a change are present. Identifying and co-opting potential opponents might be necessary to ensure the political sustainability of reforms. Second, policies that on average have a liberalizing effect on markets are not by themselves enough to guarantee their extension to the financial system. They can even worsen the situation. In this sense, understanding the interrelation between reforms, and adjusting the timing accordingly seems of first order importance.
Table I. Financial Development and Industry Margins
The table shows the coefficients obtained for the industry dummies that capture the sensitivity of each industry's price-cost margin to financial development in a regression of the price cost margin of each industry in each country on an industry dummy, a country dummy, and an industry dummy interacted with each country's level of private credit (these last dummies are the ones reported below). The data for the regression corresponds to averages of the variables for the period 1980-2000. The parameters were obtained by 2SLS instrumenting the level of private credit for each country's legal origin. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by country. 0.756*** * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table III. Trade liberalization and the political economy determinants of financial development
The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t denotes the year in which the country liberalized trade. Strengthening of promoters is the difference between the average (value added weighted) change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that score higher than median in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins (columns 1 through 4) and average firm size (columns 5 through 8). The change in the price-cost margin for each group is computed as the difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. Errors (in parentheses below each coefficient) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year fixed effects included but not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table IV. Endogeneity of Trade Liberalization and Further Robustness
The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t denotes the year in which the country liberalized trade. Strengthening of promoters is the difference between the average (value added weighted) change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that score higher than median in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins. The change in the price-cost margin for each group is computed as the difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. Change in Volume of Trade is computed as the change in the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10.
Ln(Initial Terms of Trade)
is the average Terms of Trade (1995=100) in t-5 to t-1. Strength of Promoters in the US is the average margin (t-5 to t-1) in the US of promoters minus that of opponents. Initial capital abundance is the (log) average value of capital per worker from t-5 to t-1 constructed using data from Easterly and Levine (2001) .
Initial IMF Disbursement to GDP is the average ratio of IMF disbursements to GDP between t-5 and t-1. Economic Crisis is a dummy equal to one if GDP growth is lower than -5% in any year during the t-5 to t-1period, and zero otherwise. Political Crisis is a dummy that takes one if either a government crisis or revolution happens during t-5 to t-1, and zero otherwise. Sensitivity weighed change in PCMs is the change in the price-cost margin of different industries weighed by the sensitivity of each industry´s PCM to financial development. In (8) the coefficients and standard errors correspond to the means and standard deviations of the empirical distributions obtained after performing a parametric bootstrapping on the sensitivities of different industries to financial development. In (9) the effect of financial development on margins is measured using cross-country data for the 1960s only. Except from (8) , errors (in parentheses below each coefficient) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year fixed effects included but not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t corresponds to 1973. Strengthening of promoters is the difference between the average (value added weighted) change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that score higher than median in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins. The change in the price-cost margin for each group is computed as the difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. In columns 5 through 7 the industries of Petroleum Refineries and Miscellaneous Oil Products are dropped from all computations. Errors (in parentheses below each coefficient) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year fixed effects included but not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All Industries Non-Oil Industries only
Initial Private Credit to GDP Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table VI. Competing Explanations
The dependent variable is, for each country, the change in private credit to GDP between the period t-5 to t-1 and the period t+5 to t+10, where t corresponds to 1973. Strengthening of promoters is the difference between the average (value added weighted) change in the price-cost margin of the promoters and opponents groups. Promoters (opponents) are those industries that score higher than median in the measure of the effect of financial development on margins. The change in the price-cost margin for each group is computed as the difference in the margin between the period t-5 to t-1 and t to t+5. Strengthening of high external finance dependence industries is constructed in a way analogous to strengthening of promoters but using a dummy variable for high external finance dependence instead of the promoters indicator. External dependence-weighed changes in PCMs is based on the continuous variable in Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Change in Size of Promoters was computed as the pre-post trade liberalization change in the share of value added of each industry using the t-5 to t-1, and t+1 to t+5 averages and the promoters/opponents discrete classification. Change in share of industry weighted by sensitivity of Margins to Financial Development is analogous but uses the continuous version of the sensitivity of margins to financial development. Errors (in parentheses below each coefficient) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by year of trade liberalization. Liberalization year fixed effects included but not reported. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) among others 3 This approach, which has a long tradition in the analysis of regulatory reform dating at least since the seminal work of Stigler (1971) , has only recently being applied to the regulation of financial markets. See Kroszner (1998) for a discussion of the issues when the framework is applied to banking and financial regulatory reform across countries. 4 The use of the firm level data available for different countries is not an option in our case because these datasets have a very limited number of countries and data typically start after 1990 for those developing countries included. 5 Cash conversion cycle is defines as inventories*365/(cost of goods sold) + receivables*365/total salespayables*365/costs of goods sold. 6 As mentioned above, we cannot identify the absolute impact of financial development on PCM for different industries but only the differential effect across industries. Any classification based on the actual values of the coefficients will therefore have no economic content. 7 A previous version of the paper used the share in the value added in each group of promoters and opponents. Similar results were obtained because both groups tend to have similar sizes. 8 Rajan and Zingales (2003) point out that the effect on financial development is likely to be stronger when the opposition of financial sector incumbents is muted by free flow of capital. 9 The sample of countries used in the study and the corresponding dates of trade liberalization are reported below in Table 3 . 10 Volume of trade corresponds to the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP, and was obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2003. 11 The reason to use the median absolute deviation instead of the standard deviation or the 2 R is that because of the small number of countries for which we can perform the exercise (average number of countries in a given event time is around 25) the last two measures are too sensitive to outliers. A robust measure of 2 R obtained from a trimmed regression (not reported) gives similar results. 12 By using the average shares before liberalization we are assuming that the liberalization has no effect on shares in the five year window, which is indeed the case. Results obtained using different shares before and after are analogous. 13 For previous evidence see, for example, Rajan and Zingales (2003) , and Stulz and Williamson (2003) . 14 Notice that we do not include the years immediately after the event ( 5 to τ τ + ) to compute the level of 20 A different way of controlling for this possibility is to add the initial relative strength of promoters as a control to the benchmark regression. Again, we do not observe any significant impact on the main coefficient (not reported). 21 The bootstrapping procedure was performed as follows. At each point in the iteration we use the information reported in Table I to draw a new value for the sensitivity of each industry to financial development from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equals to those reported in the table. We then use these new sensitivities to re-classify industries among promoters and opponents, measure the impact of trade liberalization on the strengthening of promoters, and re-estimate the benchmark. The procedure was repeated 1000 times. 22 We were unable to measure the markups-financial development elasticities excluding altogether the countries that liberalized or otherwise reformed. This, because there are only 20 out of 108 countries for which data on trade liberalization are available that had not liberalized as of 2000. Several of these did not have data on financial development or margins. 23 We thank the referee for suggesting this channel. 24 Similar results are obtained when the impact of trade liberalization on external dependent industries is measured as the difference in the change in margins of the group of industries that score higher and lower than median in Rajan and Zingales (1998)'s index of external finance dependence.
